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Abstrat
This paper presents a Heterogeneous Agent Model of a nanial
market with hartist and fundamentalist traders that exhibit bounded
rationality and short-term thinking to explain the eet of under and
overreation to news. The existene of the Market Maker's nite
prie adjustment speed leads to the fat that pries do not adjust
instantaneously to new information. Chartists use moving average
rules to make their investment deisions. Chartist an transform an
underreation-only senario into a market with overreation. The use
of long moving average rules might even make the market unstable.
Furthermore, noise in nanial markets an lead to long time deou-
pling from fundamental value. Higher market eieny (low deviations
from fundamental value), on the other hand, is ahieved if high ratio-
nality and long-term thinking for the agents is assumed.
JEL lassiation: G14 - D84 - C62 - C15
Keywords: Heterogeneous Agent Model - stok market - under and
overreation to news - moving average rules - nan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1 Introdution
This paper shows that the phenomenon of under and overreation to news
an be explained by a Heterogeneous Agent Model (HAM) of a nanial
market. This eet is only onsidered santly in the literature on HAMs.
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First, an analytial disussion of a simplied linearized version of the model
without noise is presented. Instead of using Bifuration Theory, the ana-
lytial framework of lassial ontrol theory is applied. We show that the
emergene of overreation and instability depends on the hartists' strategy.
Underreation ours due to nite prie adjustment speed and risk aversion
by fundamental traders. It an be dampened by hartist behavior. In the
ase of a ombined under and overreation senario high aggressiveness of
hartists and high prie adjustment speed an lead to instability. Seondly,
a simulation-based approah of the omplex model shows that a low degree
of rationality of agents as well as short-term thinking inrease the eet of
both under and overreation and therefore derease market eieny. Sim-
ulation also onrms that market noise leads to long-term deoupling from
fundamental value.
HAMs dating bak to Day and Huang (1990) have reently beome very
popular for disussing the behavior of stok markets. These models rely on
two basi assumption: agents (i) exhibit bounded rationality and (ii) form
heterogeneous beliefs. The HAMs in nane normally distinguish between
fundamentalists, tehnial, and noise traders. The models have been applied
to dierent markets suh as ommodities (Reitz and Westerho, 2007), for-
eign exhange (De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2006), options (Frijns et al., 2010),
and stoks (Westerho, 2008). The models are able to repliate several styl-
ized fats found in atual nanial markets suh as exess volatility, random
walk behavior (indiated by insigniant autoorrelations in returns), volatil-
ity lustering (as indiated by signiant slowly dereasing autoorrelations
in absolute returns), skewness as well as exess kurtosis of return distribu-
tion (Lux, 2009). In a mathematial sense, these models are represented
by non-linear dierene equations. Current researh expands these models
to inorporate realisti trading strategies (e.g.Westerho (2006)), whilst the
mathematial analysis, mostly relying on the tools of Bifuration Theory, is
brought to a more sophistiated level (e.g. Hommes and Wagener (2009)).
This analysis helps to understand whih parameters or model features drive
the stylized fats (e.g. He and Li (2007)) and orrespond to the stability of
the market (e.g. Chiarella et al. (2009)). Major fators seem to be the rules
1
Boswijk et al. (2007) present a HAM of the S&P500 explaining the DotCom-bubble
by the overreation to good fundamental news.
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used by hartist traders (Chiarella et al., 2006) and the noise in nanial
markets (Chiarella et al., 2011).
In this paper we use the HAM framework to examine the eet of un-
der and/or overreation. This eet is inonsistent with the Eient Market
Hypothesis assuming instant prie reation to news fundamentals. Neverthe-
less, several empirial studies seem to onrm these eets in real markets.
Underreation desribes the idea that pries only sluggishly reat to new in-
formation and is therefore also often referred to as the Momentum Eet.
This eet implies that past prie movements have preditive power for fu-
ture pries, sine they are followed by returns of the same sign. Overreation
on the other side states that markets overreat to good or bad news, but
returns adjust to a mean in the long run. Therefore, this eet is also known
as Mean Reversion. These eets seem to be ontraditory. Note that un-
derreation is mostly measured in the short run, whilst overreation is found
in longer horizons of roughly three to ve years (Beehey et al., 2000).
Several models explain the eets of under and overreation based on
ndings of Behavioral Finane. Daniel et al. (1998) attribute these eets
to overondene and biased self-attribution. Individuals overestimate the
preision of private signals (overondene). By ontrast, reation to publi
events is asymmetrial: events that onrm the validity of private informa-
tion are attributed to high foreast ability, while publi information that
disonrms private information is blamed on noise or sabotage (biased self-
attribution). Daniel et al. (1998) provide simulations that show short-run
Momentum followed by long-run reversals. This is also measured by short-
run positive and long-run negative autoorrelations in returns. Note that the
model predits initial overreation followed by even more overreation. An-
other approah for explaining both eets in a unied theoretial framework
is presented by Barberis et al. (1998). They assume the two psyhologial
eets of representativeness and onservatism. The former refers to the ef-
fet that market partiipants tend to see patterns based on few observations,
while the latter refers to the slow updating of beliefs. The ombination of
these two eets is able to repliate the eet of short-term Momentum and
long-run Mean Reversion. While these models rely on the idea of a single
representative agent, the approah of Hong and Stein (1999) introdues the
interation of dierent trader types as a key to understand both eets. Due
to slow diusion of private information among so-alled Information Traders,
there is underreation and momentum in the pries, whih evokes the ation
of Momentum Traders with positive feedbak behavior reating the eet of
overreation. The authors present a hump-shaped prie reation funtion
and are also able to measure the short-run positive and long-run negative
autoorrelations. Under and overreation are both stronger when low infor-
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mation diusion is onsidered. Both Hong and Stein (1999) and Barberis
et al. (1998) present a model with initial underreation followed by subse-
quent overreation.
In the remainder of this paper, we follow the rationale of Hong and Stein
(1999) that ombined under and overreation an be explained by the inter-
ation of heterogeneous agents with bounded rationality. Therefore, a very
ommon representation of a HAM is presented in setion 2. Based on a lin-
earized version of the model, the onditions for under and overreation are
examined analytially in setion 3. In line with Chiarella et al. (2006) it is
assumed that tehnial traders use moving average rules. The window length
of this rule proves to be ruial for systemi stability. Longer moving average
rules might even lead to instability. Furthermore, we disuss the interation
of the parameters of hartist and fundamentalists aggressiveness as well as
prie reation speed of the Market Maker. One key nding is that due to the
fat that markets have a nite prie adjustment speed and are therefore not
leared at any time as assumed by Walrasian auutioneer, trend-following
hartist traders emerge and eventually lead to overreation or even insta-
bility. In setion 4 the omplex model is disussed on a simulation based
approah. The model is able to repliate several eets found in empiri-
al studies of under and overreation. Both analytial and simulation-based
approahes onrm that noise trading in ombination with Momentum trad-
ing is a ruial fator that drives real markets and aets market stability.
Setion 5 onludes and gives diretions for further researh.
2 Basi model
This setion presents the basi model. The model presented is losely related
to well-known HAMs of nanial markets as presented in reent surveys by
Hommes and Wagener (2009) and Chiarella et al. (2009). We assume mean-
variane portfolio optimization in a world with two assets: a risky asset with
expeted return Ei(rt+1) and a risk-free asset with safe return of rf
2
. The
demand for risky asset is derived with mean-variane portfolio optimization
(Hommes and Wagener, 2009):
Dit =
Ei(rt+1)− rf
RA · σ2r
(1)
2
The eet of dividends is negleted sine we assume day-trading behavior. Sine
dividends are normally only paid out one a year only, they do not matter for all but one
trading period a year.
3
The demand of a ertain group of agents i therefore ruially depends on the
group's individual expetation of future returns.
3
Demand for risky assets
inreases with high expeted exess returns (relative to risk-free rate). In-
versely, demand is low in the ase of high risk aversion RA and high volatility
of returns σ2r .
The market-learing in lassi eonomi models is modeled as a Walrasian
autioneer. The key idea is that after determining the exess market demand,
the autioneer keeps announing pries and interats with the market feed-
bak until the exess demand equals zero. This yields the lassi demand
equals supply equation:
n∑
i=1
W itD
i
t = Nt (2)
In this ase, 0 < Wt < 1 represents the market weight of a spei group of
agents. The aggregate demand should equal the supply Nt. Sine agents an
go short in stoks in the ase that they expet pries to fall, they an also
supply stoks (Dit < 0). Thus, no external supply Nt is neessary. This ase
shall be referred to as Zero Net Supply.
As presented in Chiarella et al. (2009), this modeling approah, even
though widely used in eonomi analysis, only plays a part in one real market
(the market for silver in London). Therefore, it is onvenient to model a
so-alled Market Maker mehanism for market-learing (e.g., Chiarella et al.
(2006), Westerho (2008)). Even though this approah is still very simplied,
it omes loser to prie determination in atual markets. The key idea here
is that an institution named Market Maker takes an osetting long or short
position to assure that exess demand in period t equals zero. In the next
period, the Market Maker announes a new log-prie pt+1 to redue exess
demand
4
:
pt+1 = pt + µ(
n∑
i=1
W itD
i
t −Nt) (3)
In this ase, µ > 0 represents the prie reation speed of the Market Maker.
If we assume innite reation speed, this approah redues to a Walrasian
autioneer:
lim
µ→∞
(
pt − pt+1
µ
+
n∑
i=1
W itD
i
t −Nt
)
=
n∑
i=1
W itD
i
t −Nt = 0 (4)
3
To improve the proessing of the demand in the omputational model I apply a slightly
dierent formation for the demand, whih is presented in the appendix in setion A.
4
The model uses log-pries pt instead of real pries Pt. This is briey disussed in
appendix A.
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This result will be of interest when the dynami properties of the system
are analyzed in the following setion. Furthermore, the parameter µ an be
interpreted as the liquidity of the market. In time of illiquid markets µ is
high and pries reat severely to exess demand.
In the basi model, the weights of the dierent agents vary in time. This
represents the empirial fat pointed out by Menkho and Taylor (2007) that
traders do not stik to a ertain rule, but instead use a ombination of both
tehnial and fundamental analysis. The weights of the groups are derived
using a Multinominal Logit Model as presented in Manski and MFadden
(1981):
W it =
eγA
i
t∑n
i=1 e
γAi
t
(5)
Due to the onstrution of the equation, the individual weights sum up to
one. The parameter γ presents a degree of rationality in hoosing a strategy.
In ase γ equals zero, the weights of the groups are onstant and amount to
1/n. The other extreme ase with γ onverging to innity represents the ase
in whih all individuals hoose the optimal foreast. De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2006) therefore interpret this parameter as a model of the behavioral eet
of Status Quos Bias as presented in Kahneman et al. (1991). This eet
implies that individuals nd it diult to hange a deision rule they used
in the past. In a more general way, this parameter an also be onsidered
as a value for bounded rationality in the sense of Simon (1955). Due to the
limited resoures of time and money, individuals use suboptimal rules.
The weight of a strategy W it in the market is evaluated by its attrative-
ness Ait in a period t. This parameter is modeled in the following way
5
:
Ait = D
i
t−1 · (rt − rf) + ηAit−1 ≈ Dit−1 · (ln(1 + rt)− ln(1 + rf)) + ηAit−1
= Dit−1 · (pt − pt−1 − ln(1 + rf)) + ηAit−1
(6)
It onsiders the prots a strategy yielded between period (t− 1) and t. Note
that a prot is made in the ase where risky assets are bought when returns
are higher than risk-free returns, or risky assets are sold when their return
is lower than the return of the risk-free asset. The parameter 0 < η < 1
represents the memory of the agent. If it is set to zero, myopi traders
that only value the very last suess of the strategy are onsidered. In the
ase η = 1, instead of prots the aumulated wealth of a group is taken
into aount. This modeling approah enables us to investigate the eet
5
This equation builds on results presented in appendix A.
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of short-term fousing in nanial markets. The parameters γ and η are
therefore the key to measuring the degree of irrationality in markets.
The model investigates four dierent strategies: (i) fundamentalism, (ii)
hartism using moving average rules, (iii) noise trading, and (iv) a passive
investment strategy. Fundamental traders know the true fundamental log-
value of an asset ft and expet the pries to onverge to it. Their expetations
an therefore be modeled in the following way:
EF (pt+1)− pt = α(ft − pt) (7)
The parameter 0 < α < 1 measures the speed at whih fundamentalist
traders expet pries of stok to onverge to their true underlying value.
This strategy an be interpreted as the the Hedge Fund strategy of so-alled
Alpha Seeking trying to buy undervalued and to sell overvalued seurities in
the market (seurities whose α, representing the deviation from the Seurity
Market Line, are positive, respetively negative). Their ation ontributes to
higher market eieny.
Chartists on the other hand do not onsider fundamental pries, but
derive order signals from past pries. There are several studies indiating
widespread use of tehnial analysis (even) among professional traders in
partiular in foreign exhange markets. Chartism is espeially important for
short-term foreast horizons.
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Hong and Stein (1999) show that hartism
an be useful in exploiting the general underreation of markets. Chartism is
often also referred to as Tehnial Trading, sine it derives its trading signals
from lear rules that an be automated. For this reason it is also very easy
to implement these rules in a HAM. One of the easiest rules to implement is
the moving average rule:
EC(pt+1)− pt = β
[
1
Ns
Ns−1∑
i=0
pt−i − 1
Nl
Nl−1∑
i=0
pt−i
]
(8)
This strategy ompares a long to a short-moving average (Ns < Nl). The
use of the moving averages an be explained by market noise: it lters u-
tuations around a long-run trend (Menkho and Taylor, 2007).
7
Normally,
an intersetion of the two moving averages is required to generate a trading
signal. If we neglet this ondition, this rule an generate a trading signal in
eah trading period implying that traders are always in the market (Brok
et al., 1992). Another important feature of this rule is that it shows Momen-
tum behavior by generating buying signals in ase of inreasing pries and
6
For a survey the reader is referred to Menkho and Taylor (2007).
7
In a ontrol theory sense, a moving average ats as a low-pass lter, whih lters away
high-frequeny noise.
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selling signals in ase of dereasing pries (Menkho and Taylor, 2007)
8
. The
parameter 0 < β < 1 measures the aggressiveness with whih the hartist
traders take positions in the market.
A ruial fator in market trading is noise trading. Aording to Blak
(1986), noise traders trade on noise as if it were information. Noise is modeled
as an i.i.d. proess with mean zero and variane σ2i . This is onsistent with
the onsideration of Shleifer (2000) that noise should, on mean, anel itself
out. Noise trading an also be explained by the need for liquidity (here the
need to raise apital for other reasons (Bouhaud et al., 2009)). In line with
Westerho (2008), noise is onsidered in three parts of the model. First,
there is a demand of pure noise traders at whih is inluded in the Market
Maker equation:
pt+1 = pt + µ(
n∑
i=1
W itD
i
t −Nt) + at (9)
On the other side, both fundamentalist and hartist traders have features of
noise traders. Therefore their expetations formation is also superimposed
by noisy proesses bt and ct:
EF (pt+1)− pt = α(ft − pt) + bt (10)
EC(pt+1)− pt = β
[
1
Ns
Ns−1∑
i=0
pt−i − 1
Nl
Nl−1∑
i=0
pt−i
]
+ ct (11)
Sine hartists exhibit more irrational behavior, it is assumed that σc > σb.
The last remaining group are passive traders. Sine they only invest in
the risk-free asset, the attrativeness of their strategy is always zero, implying
that they do not earn exess return relative to the risk-free rate. Note that if
fundamentalists or hartists fail to predit future prie movements orretly,
their attrativeness an beome negative. Aordingly, the weight of the
passive agents inreases. Apart from that, high risk-free rates, high risk
aversions and high volatility of stoks ontribute to the attrativeness of the
passive strategy modeling a ight to quality. Sine passive traders do not
take orders in the market, they do not have an impat on the pries.
8
The opposite is the ase for a Mean Reversion strategy, whih is heavily used by
Hedge Funds. If a short moving average is below a long moving average, a buying signal is
pereived. The long-moving average in the Mean Reversion strategy therefore an therefore
be onsidered a proxy for the fundamental value derived upon histori data.
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3 Analytial approah in a linearized version of
the model
The analytial approah applies the tehniques of ontrol theory in the fre-
queny domain. These rules have been developed for linear dierential equa-
tions. The use of linear dierential equations for the modeling of stok market
behavior dates bak to Beja and Goldman (1980) and is still widely used in
models suh as Chiarella et al. (2011). Sine the model onsists of non-linear
dierene equations, several simpliations have to be made. First, we as-
sume that pries are desribed by a ontinuous time funtion p(t) instead of
a disrete funtion pt with the following property:
pt+1 − pt ≈ dp(t)
dt
= p˙ (12)
Furthermore, the simplied model assumes risk-neutral investors and a risk-
free rate of zero, whih leads to the fat that demand equals the expeted
hange of log-pries of eah group
9
:
Dit = Ei(pt+1)− pt (13)
If we now onsider the ase of γ = 0 for the weighting equation (equation 5),
we model totally irrational individuals who stik to a rule, even though it is
not protable. Taking into aount equation 5 this results in the fat that all
three rules have the same market share. If we neglet the saling behavior of
the weighting fator, the following ontinuous time Market Maker equation
an be derived:
p˙ = µ(
1
3
·DC + 1
3
DF ) ≈ µ(DC +DF ) (14)
This result is idential to the one of Chiarella et al. (2011). The same re-
sult an be derived if totally rational (γ onverging to innity) but myopi
investors (η = 0) are onsidered10. Thereby the analytial results in this
hapter apply for total irrational as well as extremely myopi investors. The
noise terms in the models are set to their expeted value of zero (De Grauwe
and Grimaldi, 2006).
9
This formation of demand is based on the results presented in appendix A. Higher risk
aversion an be onsidered if low values for the aggressiveness of a strategy as measured
in the parameters α and β are assumed. Sine the daily risk-free rate is lose to zero it is
usually negleted (e.g. Fama (1998)).
10
The derivation of the law of motion of pries assuming η = 0 and γ →∞ is presented
in appendix B.
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First, we want to examine the fundamentalist-only ase (β = 0). This
results in the following law of motion for log-pries p:
p˙ = µ(α(f − p)) (15)
If we transfer this equation into the frequeny domain, the following response
funtion F (s) to a step-shok in fundamental value an be derived:
F (s) =
p(s)
f(s)
=
1
1 + s
µα
(16)
By assuming a step funtion, we examine the eet of pries in the ase where
the log-fundamental value f suddenly hanges from zero to one. The result
resembles the lassi PT1-behavior of ontrol theory (Unbehauen, 2008):
F (s) =
K
1 + Ts
(17)
The system onverges to a nal value of K with a speed of T (see gure 1).
Sine in this ase K = 1, the model onverges to its fundamental value. In
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Figure 1: Response of a PT1 system to a step funtion
this ase an underreation-only senario is produed. The eet of underre-
ation is stronger for high values of T :
T =
1
µα
⇒ s = − 1
T
= − 1
µα
< 0 (18)
The eet of underreation is therefore stronger in ase the ase of low prie
adjustment speed µ (i.e. high market liquidity) as well as the low aggres-
siveness of fundamental agents α (i.e. high risk aversion of fundamentalists).
The system is always stable sine the eigenvalue is always negative. If we fur-
thermore take into aount a Walrasian autioneer as a speial ase of Market
9
Maker with innite onversion speed, there is no underreation (T = 0). The
same result an be derived for the ase of risk-neutral fundamental trader
(α onverging to innity). This is onsistent with the idea of the EMH that
pries adjust instantaneously to news (Menkho and Taylor, 2007).
Now, the eet of dierent tehnial rules on the behavior of pries is
investigated. We start by assuming the very simple ase of Ns = 1 and
Nl = 2. This yields the following demand for hartists:
DC = β(pt − 1
2
(pt − pt−1)) = β
2
(pt − pt−1) (19)
This modeling for the demand of hartists is frequently used in HAMs (e.g.
Westerho (2008)). The main idea is that hartists expet the most reent
trend to ontinue at a speed of
β
2
. Considering dierential instead of dierene
equation hartist demand an be presented as follows
11
:
DC =
β
2
(pt − pt−1) = β
2
(p˙− p¨) (20)
If we insert this into the Market Maker equation and transfer it into the fre-
queny domain, the following response funtion F (s) to a step in fundamental
value an be derived
12
:
F (s) =
p(s)
f(s)
=
1
β
2α
s2 + 2−µβ
2µα
s+ 1
(21)
This behavior represents the so-alled PT2 funtion of ontrol theory (Unbe-
hauen, 2008):
F (s) =
K
1
ω2
0
s2 + 2D
ω0
s + 1
(22)
The eigenvalues of the system are dened by the following equation:
s1/2 = ω0(−D ±
√
D2 − 1) (23)
In this ase, the variables D and ω0 are given as follows:
ω0 =
√
2α
β
(24)
11
A derivation of this result is presented in appendix C.
12
A short introdution to the analysis of linear dierential equation in the frequeny
domain is given in the appendix C. This setion also presents the derivation and the
disussion of the transfer funtions for the dierent presented ases.
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D =
2− µβ
2
√
2µ
√
αβ
(25)
Depending on the value ofD three ases an be distinguished (see gure 2). In
the rst ase D > 1, the system onverges in a slow proess of underreation
to its fundamental value like the PT1 transfer funtion. The ondition for
underreation-only therefore is as follows:
2 > µ
√
β(
√
β + 2
√
2
√
α) (26)
Low values of prie adjustment speed µ as well as low aggressiveness of agents
α and β therefore lead to the underreation-only senario. Keeping in mind
that low aggressiveness an also be interpreted as high risk aversion by agents
this leads to the result that underreation is promoted in a senario with
high risk aversion. Furthermore, low values of µ an be interpreted as high
liquidity. This implies that overreation tends to our more frequently in
illiquid markets. Note that in the presene of hartists high aggressiveness
by both hartist and fundamental traders lead to overreation.
Overreation on the other side ours in seond ase of 0 < D < 1. As
presented in Hommes (2011), the eet of overreation an only be produed
in the ase where hartist traders with autoregressive behavior of at least
seond order (AR(2) behavior) are assumed. The simulation shows the well-
known hump-shaped prie pattern as presented in Daniel et al. (1998) and
Hong and Stein (1999) of underreation in the rst instane followed by
subsequent overreation (see gure 2). In the long-run, the system onverges
0 2 4 6 8 10
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
t
 
 
Step
D=0.5
D= − 0.1
D=2.5
Figure 2: Response of a PT2 system to a step funtion with exemplary values
for D
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to its underlying fundamental value.
This does not hold in the third ase (D < 0). For µβ > 2 we have an
unstable system. High prie adjustment speed and the high aggressiveness
of hartist traders therefore lead to instability.
The parameter ω0 represents the frequeny of prie behavior. In the ase
of underreation-only, high values of ω0 therefore indiate fast onversion to
fundamental value, whilst in the ase of ombined under and overreation
they lead to faster swings between under and overreation. High value for
fundamentalist aggressiveness α relative to the aggressiveness of hartists
β therefore at rst sight might therefore lead to less underreation. On the
other side, as presented in equation 26, higher values of α lead to overreation.
In other words, high aggressiveness of fundamentalists in order to redue
underreation leads to the eet of overreation of market pries to news.
If we now assume Ls = 1 and Ll = 3, the following hartist demand an
be derived:
Dc = β
[
pt − 1
3
2∑
i=0
pt−i
]
= β
[
2
3
pt − 1
3
pt−1 − 1
3
pt−2
]
(27)
The prie reation funtion is desribed by the following equation:
13
F (s) =
1
− β
α3
s3 + 4β
3α
s2 + (1−µβ
µα
)s+ 1
(28)
This system is always unstable. Therefore the theoretial results of Chiarella
et al. (2009) whih show that longer moving average rules destabilize the
market are onrmed.
4 Simulation of the omplex model
As disussed in setion 3, the analytial approah required some simplia-
tions. Therefore, the simulation results of the omplex model are ompared
with the linearized model. In the proess, we also want to investigate the
parameter of autoorrelation intensely disussed in empirial studies of under
and overreation.
Applying a shok of ln(2) ≈ 0.69 in log-fundamental value ft is idential
to a doubling of real fundamental value Ft. Figure 3 shows simulation re-
sults for the ase with Ls = 1 and Ll = 2 in a zero-noise-framework. The
parameters are set to µ = 1 and α = β = 0.6 implying overreation for
13
The determination of this equation is presented in appendix C.
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Figure 3: (left:) Prie reation to a step shok in news in both linearized and
omplex model; (right:) Weight of agents in omplex model
the linearized model. Furthermore, the values of η = 0.985 for memory and
γ = 20 for rationality are assumed.14 Note that the hump-shaped pattern is
only produed in the linearized ase. This an be explained by the fat that
the linearized version assumes onstant weights of agents (WC = WF = 1).
As presented in gure 3, the shok in news fundamentals is aompanied
by a higher weight of fundamentalist traders. Sine the weight of Momentum
Traders is less important than in the linearized model there is no overreation.
Even though there is no overreation in the omplex ase, it also exhibits the
negative autoorrelation for higher time lags (see gure 4). For that reason,
long-run negative autoorrelations do not have to signify overreation.
14
The risk aversion is assumed as RA = 10 and the risk-free rate as rf = 0.01% (equals
an annual rate of approximately rf = 2.5%).
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Figure 4: Autoorrelation of raw and absolute returns in both linearized and
omplex model after a step shok in news fundamentals
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Figure 5: Prie reation to a step shok in news fundamentals in the omplex
model with Ll = 3 and variation of rationality γ and memory η
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The Ll = 3 is always unstable in the linearized version, whilst the omplex
ase produes underreation. In gure 5 the parameters for rationality γ and
memory η are varied for this ase. High values of rationality γ and memory
η lead to lower underreation and therefore to higher market eieny.
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Figure 6: Prie reation to a step shok in news fundamentals in the omplex
model with Ll = 4, µ = 1.4, and variation of rationality γ and memory η
When simulating the ase with Ll = 4 in the omplex model and further
also assuming µ = 1.4, the lassi hump-shaped pattern of overreation is
produed. As shown in gure 6, a higher degree of rationality γ leads to
lower overreation. Short-term thinking (low values for η) on the other side
amplies the eet of overreation. Simulation onrmed that the eet of
memory is more important than the eet of rationality. Sine high mem-
ories and high rationality lead to both lower under and overreation they
ontribute to higher market eieny.
Simulation assumed zero noise. Now, dierent forms of noise are applied
for the Ll = 3 ase. As shown in gure 7, pure noise trading noise σa and
fundamentalist noise σb only lead to noise-indued swings around the true
fundamental value. Chartist noise σc on the other hand leads to a permanent
trend away from the fundamental value.
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Figure 8: Weights of agents with step shok to news fundamentals and noise
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Figure 9: Autoorrelation of raw and absolute returns in the omplex model
after a shok in news fundamentals in the ase of noise
This an be explained by the fat that high noise makes the hartist's
proess attrative. As shown in gure 8, for the ase with all three forms of
noise, after the fundamental shok in period 20 whih makes fundamentalism
attrative, hartist traders take over the market and destabilize it. Noise also
leads to the fat that the autoorrelations of the returns beome insigniant
and lose their patterns (see gure 9). Therefore, it is diult to derive results
from empirial studies of autoorrelation.
5 Conlusion
In this paper the phenomenon of under and overreation to news in nanial
markets is disussed within the framework of a Heterogeneous Agent Model.
This model relies on the idea that market pries are the result of the intera-
tion of fundamental and tehnial traders both subjet to bounded rational-
ity as well as short-term thinking. Furthermore, there is noise in the trading
proess. An analytial approah of the linearized model onrmed that the
existene of nite prie adjustment speed and risk-aversion of fundamental
traders leads to underreation. A fundamental-only senario with innite
prie adjustment speed (Walrasian autioneer) on the other hand an repli-
ate the instantaneous adjustment to news fundamentals as predited by the
Eient Market Hypothesis. Chartist behavior transform an underreation-
only senario into a senario with under and overreation. Consistent with
Chiarella et al. (2006), the use of longer moving average rules also leads to
systemi instability.
17
Based on a simulation this paper also shows that the analytial approah
overestimates the eet of nanial fragility by assuming onstant agent
weights. In the simulation, news leads to a higher weight of fundamental
agents that transforms the system bak to its fundamental value. The sim-
ulation is able to reprodue the short-run positive and long-run negative
autoorrelations in returns shown in empirial studies. Apart from that, the
simulation onrms that high degrees of rationality and long-term thinking
derease the eet of underreation. In a senario with overreation, high
rationality an derease the eet of overreation. Short-term thinking with
low values for memory on the other hand, worsens the eet of overreation.
The simulation also onsiders the eet of noise. First of all, noise in
nanial markets makes it diult to derive results from empirial studies of
autoorrelation. Moreover, in ombination with hartist trading noise leads
to further deoupling from fundamental value.
Further researh therefore should analyze the eet of noise in more de-
tail. This paper only presents a very simplied analytial approah. Deeper
insights might be gained in the ase where the model is analyzed in the so-
alled z-domain developed for dierene equations (e.g. Juang (1994)). Fur-
thermore, more realisti moving-average rules, as presented in Brok et al.
(1992), should be examined in a simulation-based approah. Further researh
should also disuss the eet of these rules on statistial properties ommonly
investigated in HAMs.
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A Demand in the omputational model
The omputational model proesses log-pries pt instead of real pries Pt.
This has the advantage that in ontrast to real pries, whih annot fall
below zero, log-pries are not bounded. Reall the following mathematial
onnetion for log-pries:
E(pt+1)−pt = ln(E(Pt+1))− ln(Pt) = ln
(
E(Pt+1)
Pt
)
= ln(1+E(rt+1)) (29)
Reall the rst-order Taylor approximation for the ln funtion:
ln(1 + x) = x+O(x2) (30)
If we now use these results, the demand of group i an be displayed in the
following way:
Dit =
Ei(pt+1)− pt − ln(1 + rf)
RA · σ2r + 1
=
ln(1 + Ei(rt+1))− ln(1 + rf )
RA · σ2r + 1
≈ Ei(rt+1)− rf
RA · σ2r + 1
(31)
Note that the value of one is added up in the denominator. This happens for
two reasons: (i) As the variane at the beginning of omputing time is zero,
simulation would otherwise run into problems of zero division. (ii) In this
modeling approah RA ats as a saling fator. By setting this parameter to
zero we an aount for risk-neutral individuals.
B A dierent linearization approah for the model
The linearization approah presented in the text is independent of the mem-
ory of agents η. A similar result an be derived if we assume optimal weight-
ing (γ onverging to innity) but short-term thinking due to zero memory
(η = 0). We simplify the weighting equation by using the rst-order Taylor
approah for the exponential funtion:
ex = 1 + x+ 0(x2) (32)
The weighting in this ase only depends on the attrativeness:
Wi =
1 + γAi∑3
i=1(1 + γAi)
= lim
γ→∞
(
1
γ
+ Ai
3
γ
+
∑3
i=1Ai
)
=
Ai∑3
i=1Ai
(33)
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By also assuming a zero risk-free rate, the attrativeness an be determined
by the following dierential equation:
Ait = (pt − pt−1)Dit + 0 · Ait−1 ⇒ Ai = (p˙− p¨)Di (34)
This results in the following market equation, whih an be simplied by
assuming small values for demand so that it represents the one presented in
equation 14.
p˙ = µ
[
AC
AC + AF
·DC + AF
AC + AF
·DF
]
= µ
[
(p˙− p¨) ·DC ·DC + (p˙− p¨) ·DF ·DF
(p˙− p¨)(DC +DF )
]
= µ
[
D2C +D
2
F
DC +DF
]
= µ
[
DC +DF − 2DC ·DF
DC +DF
]
≈ µ(DC +DF )
(35)
Therefore, this Market Maker equation an be derived if bounded rationality
due to suboptimal rules or myopi thinking is onsidered.
C Derivation of the dierent transfer funtions
The transformation from the time domain t to the frequeny domain s is
given by the solution of the Fourier integral (Unbehauen (2008)):
y(s) =
∫
∞
0
y(t)e−stdt (36)
It an be desribed by the following symbolism:
y(t) d ty(s) (37)
One of the most important transformations is the one for derivatives (Unbe-
hauen (2008)):
dny(t)
dtn
d tsny(s)−
n∑
i=1
sn−i
(
d(i−1)f(t)
dti−1
)
t=0+
(38)
The transfer funtion F (s) desribes the behavior of a dynami system y to
the input u and is dened in the following way (Unbehauen (2008, p. 60)):
F (s) =
y(s)
u(s)
=
b0 + b1s+ · · ·+ bmsm
a0 + a1s+ · · ·+ ansn =
N(s)
D(s)
(39)
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By setting the denominator to zero (D(s)
!
= 0) we an derive the so-alled
poles or eigenvalues of the system s1, s2, · · · , sn, whih desribe the homoge-
neous solution of the system in the time domain (Unbehauen (2008)):
yhom(t) =
n∑
i=1
Cie
si·t
(40)
The stability ondition is that the real part of the eigenvalue is negative
(Re {si} < 0) (Unbehauen (2008, p. 140)).
The hartist demand for the ase Ls = 1 and Ll = 2 an be derived if we
onsider the following assumption for the seond order derivative:
p¨ ≈ p˙(t)− p˙(t− 1) ≈ (pt+1 − pt)− (pt − pt−1) = pt+1 − 2pt + pt−1 (41)
This results in the following hartist demand DC :
DC =
β
2
(pt − pt−1) = β
2
((pt+1 − pt)− (pt+1 − 2pt + pt−1)) = β
2
(p˙− p¨) (42)
Using these results the following transfer funtion an be derived:
p˙ = µ
[
β
2
(p˙− p¨) + α(f − p)
]
d tp(s)
(
µβ
2
s2 + (1− µβ
2
)s+ µα
)
= f(s) · µα
⇒ F (s) = µα
µβ
2
s2 + (1− µβ
2
)s+ µα
=
1
β
2α
s2 + (2−µβ)
2µα
s+ 1
(43)
Now, the ase of Ls = 1 and Ll = 3 is presented. The transformation
of the dierene equation into a dierential equation requires the following
onnetion:
...
p t ≈ p¨(t)− p¨(t− 1)
≈ (pt − 2pt−1 + pt−2)− (pt−1 − 2pt−2 + pt−3) = pt − 3pt−1 + 3pt−2 − pt−3
(44)
The hartist demand an therefore be desribed by the following equation:
1
3
...
p − 4
3
p¨+ p˙
=
(
1
3
pt+1 − pt + pt−1 − 1
3
pt−2
)
+
(
−4
3
pt+1 +
8
3
pt − 4
3
pt−1
)
+ (pt+1 − pt)
=
2
3
pt − 1
3
pt−1 − 1
3
pt−2 − 1
3
pt−3
(45)
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Using this result the transfer funtion is alulated:
p˙ = µ
[
β(
1
3
...
p − 4
3
p¨ + p˙) + α(f − p)
]
d tp(s)
(
−µβ
3
s3 +
4
3
µβs2 + (1− µβ) s+ µα
)
= f(s) · µα
⇒ F (s) = 1− β
α3
s3 + 4β
3α
s2 + (1−µβ
µα
)s+ 1
(46)
This system is always unstable. This system is a so-alled PT3 system, whih
an be desribed as serial onnetion of three PT1 systems. Mathematially,
this an be done by multiplying PT1 funtions:
F (s) =
(
K
sT + 1
)3
=
K3
s3T 3 + 3s2T 2 + 3sT + 1
(47)
Sine the stability ondition for the PT1 system requires T > 0 all oeients
of the denominator of the PT3 funtion have to be positive as well. In
this ase the oeient of s3 is always negative, thus rendering the system
unstable.
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